Anti-Japanese Sentiment: a Challenge for the CCP
Guest AuthorSimon Smith is a research analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.
Anti-Japanese protests currently underway in China are following a well-worn script. To borrow a phrase from Geremie Barmé, to screw Japan is patriotic in modern China. Having actively cultivated this attitude, some analysts believe that Beijing is increasingly in danger of being forced into a confrontation with Japan. These claims are overly pessimistic. Pragmatic strategic calculations, not popular nationalism, are still the guiding principles of the bilateral relationship. At the end of the day, anti-Japanese nationalism is a greater headache for Beijing than Tokyo.
From its beginnings the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has bolstered allegiance to its rule by highlighting patriotic themes that reinforce the party’s legitimacy. Even before the Tiananmen movement erupted in 1989, the CCP had begun reviving and sustaining anti-Japanese sentiment as a central theme of a repackaged, post-communist nationalism. Younger generations with no living memory of Japanese imperialism were exposed to a highly detailed and at times exaggerated wartime history. Japan quickly became a symbol of national humiliation, historical weakness and the dangers of disunity at home.
photo by Flickr user Shanghai SlideThe Chinese public is now highly receptive to negative news and conjecture about Japan. Whenever there is a bilateral dispute, Chinese citizens will expect Tokyo to make concessions as a way of atoning for past crimes. If the Japanese side refuses to yield, Chinese nationalists will claim that Japan’s belligerent nature has been reawakened. If the Chinese government is willing to compromise, they will be accused of going ‘soft’ on Japan. In order to soothe public outrage and deflect criticism of the government, the CCP will maintain a hard-headed approach towards Japan. Even when Beijing and Tokyo manage to reach a diplomatic truce, the Chinese public’s emotional dedication to demonising Japanese behaviour will sustain increased tension at the official level.
Anti-Japanese nationalism is a double-edged sword for Beijing. On the one hand, nationalism encourages allegiance to the state and provides the government with significant leverage in its relations with Tokyo, if not more broadly. On the other, it can undermine China’s claims to being a stable destination for foreign investment and create image problems abroad. More worryingly for Beijing, popular nationalism can in fact challenge the legitimacy of the government: having championed a series of interests deemed sacred to the Chinese nation, the CCP now carries the burden of expectation.
No Chinese government in modern history, the late Qing, Republican, or Communist, has been successful in suppressing popular nationalism. When they have tried, widespread revolts have ensued. At best the current government in Beijing can continue to co-opt anti-Japanese sentiments by championing the Chinese nation, filtering information it deems too inflammatory and exercising control over public demonstrations to avoid them escalating into broader social unrest.
This task is becoming a lot more difficult in the age of the Internet. Nurtured in classrooms and emboldened in online chat rooms, anti-Japanese nationalism often goes beyond the official line. A small collection of protesters last weekend used the occasion to air domestic grievances, carrying signs that called for freedom of speech, an end to official corruption and lower housing prices. The CCP is aware that anti-Japanese protests can raise sentiments and issues that the government would prefer not to deal with.
Managing popular nationalism is largely a domestic challenge. While there are genuine concerns about the future stability of the Sino-Japanese relationship, the influence of grassroots nationalism does not rank high on the list. The last three decades have demonstrated that, despite setbacks in the relationship, Beijing and Tokyo are willing to cooperate and temper their differences. To be sure, history shows that nationalism can increase the possibility of international conflict. Importantly, however, there are few signs that popular nationalism has replaced long-term strategic interests as the driving rationale for Chinese foreign policy. As long as anti-Japanese sentiments are principally for a domestic audience with domestic aims, the bilateral relationship will continue to muddle through.